The usual reading of logical implication A → B as " if A then B " fails in intuitionistic logic: there are formulas A and B such that A → B is not provable, even though B is provable whenever A is provable. Intuitionistic rules apparently don't capture interesting meta-properties of the logic and, from a computational perspective, the programs corresponding to intuitionistic proofs are not powerful enough. Such non-provable implications are nevertheless admissible, and we study their behaviour by means of a proof term assignment and related rules of reduction. We introduce V, a calculus that is able to represent admissible inferences, while remaining in the intuitionistic world by having normal forms that are just intuitionistic terms. We then extend intuitionistic logic with principles corresponding to admissible rules. As an example, we consider the Kreisel-Putnam logic KP, for which we prove the strong normalization and the disjunction property through our term assignment. This is our first step in understanding the essence of admissible rules for intuitionistic logic.
Introduction
Proof systems are usually presented inductively by giving axioms and rules of inference, which are respectively the ingredients and the tools for cooking new proofs. For example, when presenting classical propositional logic (CPC) in natural deduction, for each of the usual connectives ∧, ∨, ¬, →, ⊥ one gives a set of standard tools to introduce or remove a connective from a formula in order to obtain a proof.
In their most essential form, we can represent rules as an inference A 1 , ..., A n / B (read "from A 1 , ..., A n infer B") where A 1 , . . . , A n , B are schemata of logic formulas. A rule A 1 , . . . , A n / B is said to be admissible in a proof system if it is in a way redundant, i.e. whenever A 1 . . . A n are provable, then B is already provable without using that rule. Adding or dropping rules may increase or decrease the amount of proofs we can cook in a proof system. The effect can be dramatic: for example, classical propositional logic CPC can be obtained by simply adding the rule of double negation elimination (¬¬A / A) to intuitionistic propositional logic IPC. Admissible rules are all the opposite: if we decide to utilize one in order to cook something, then we could have just used our ingredients in a different way to reach the same result.
One appealing feature of CPC is the fact that it is structurally complete: all its admissible rules are derivable, in the sense that whenever A 1 , . . . , A n / B is an admissible rule, then also the corresponding principle A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n → B is provable [4] -i.e. the system acknowledges that there's no need for that additional tool, so we can internalize it and use the old tools to complete our reasoning. This is not the case in intuitionistic logic: the mere fact that we know that the tool was not needed, doesn't give us any way to show inside the system why is that. On the other hand, IPC has other wonderful features. Relevant here is the disjunction property, fundamental for a constructive system: when a disjunction A ∨ B is provable, then one of the disjuncts A or B is provable as well. Our interest is in these intuitionistic admissible rules that are not derivable, in the computational principles they describe, and in the logic systems obtained by explicitly adding such rules to IPC.
Can one effectively identify all intuitionistic admissible rules? The question of whether that set of rules is recursively enumerable was posed by Friedman in 1975, and answered positively by Rybakov in 1984. It was then de Jongh and Visser who exhibited a numerable set of rules (now known as Visser's rules) and conjectured that it formed a basis for all the admissible rules of IPC. This conjecture was later proved by Iemhoff in the fundamental [6] . Rozière in his Ph.D. thesis [9] reached the same conclusion with a substantially different technique, independently of Visser and Iemhoff. These works elegantly settled the problem of identifying and building admissible rules. However our question is different: why are these rules superfluous, and what reduction steps can eliminate them from proofs?
Rozière first posed the question of finding a computational correspondence for his basis of the admissible rules in the conclusion of his thesis, but no work has been done on this ever since. Natural deduction provides a powerful tool to analyse the computational behaviour of logical axioms, thanks to the fact that it gives a simple way to translate axioms into rules and to develop correspondences with λ -calculi. Our plan is therefore to understand the phenomenon of admissibility by equipping proofs with λ -terms and associated reductions in the spirit of the Curry-Howard correspondence. Normalization will show explicitly what role admissible rules play in a proof.
Visser's Basis
The central role in the developement of the paper is played by Visser's basis of rules. The term basis means that any rule that is admissible for IPC is obtainable by combining some of the rules of the family with other intuitionistic reasoning. It consists of the following sequence of rules:
This is read as: for every natural number n, whenever the left part of the rule (a n-ary implication) is provable, then the right part (an n + 2-ary disjunction) is provable. It forms a basis in the sense that all other admissible rules of IPC can be obtained from the combination of rules from this family with the usual rules of intuitionistic logic. It is an infinite family, since Visser n+1 cannot be derived from Visser 1 ,. . . ,Visser n [9] .
The importance of Visser's basis is not limited to intuitionistic logic but also applies more generally to intermediate logics, as witnessed by the following: Theorem 1.1 (Iemhoff [7] ). If the rules of Visser's basis are admissible in a logic, then they form a basis for the admissible rules of that logic This theorem also gives us a simple argument to prove the structural completeness of CPC: since all the Visser n rules are provable in CPC, they are admissible and therefore they constitute a basis for all the admissible rules of CPC; but since the Visser n are derivable, all admissible rules are derivable.
Contributions and Structure of the Paper
In Section 2 we introduce the natural deduction rules corresponding to Visser's rules, and present the associated λ -calculus V: we show that proofs in the new calculus normalize to ordinary intuitionistic proofs. In the remaining part of the paper, we push further our idea and start adapting our calculus to intermediate logics characterized by axioms derived from admissible rules. In Section 3 we study the well-known Harrop's rule, and more precisely the logic KP obtained by adding Harrop's principle to IPC: we prove good properties like subject reduction, the disjunction property, and strong normalization. In Section 4 we quickly introduce the logic AD (obtained by adding the axiom V 1 to IPC) as a candidate for future study, and possible extensions to arithmetic. Proofs can be found in the appendices at the end of the paper.
Proof Terms for the Admissible Rules: V
In this section, we are going to assign proof terms to all the inferences of Visser's basis in a uniform way. First, we give a natural deduction flavor to the Visser rules. Since the conclusion of the left-hand side of the rules is a disjunction, we model the rules as generalized disjunction eliminations ∨ E ; "generalized" because the main premise will be the disjunction in the antecedent of the Visser n , but under n implicative assumptions. Therefore the rules of inference Visser n have the form:
In order to keep the rules admissible, we need to restrict the usage of the inference: the additional requirement is that the proofs of the main premise (the one on the left with end-formula A 1 ∨ A 2 ) must be closed proofs, i.e. cannot have open assumptions others than the ones discharged by that Visser inference. Otherwise we would be able to go beyond IPC, since for example we would prove all the principles corresponding to the admissible rules (as in system AD, see Section 4). On the other side, it is straightforward to see that our rules directly correspond to rules of Visser's basis, and that they adequately represent admissibility. We now turn to proof terms:
Figure 1: Proof terms
Since the shape of the rules is the elimination of a disjunction, the proof term associated with this inference will be modeled on the case analysis case[− | | − | −]. The difference will be in the number of assumptions that are bound, and in the number of possible cases. We use the vector notation x.t on variables to indicate that a sequence of (indexed) variables x 1 , . . . , x n is bound, and on terms like z. u to indicate a sequence of (indexed) terms u 1 , . . . , u n on each of which we are binding the variable z. The resulting annotation for a Visser inference is then:
D We call V the calculus obtained by adding this family of rules of inference to IPC. The syntax of V can be found in Figure 1 , and it includes the usual proof terms for intuitionistic logic [10] , plus the proof terms
We now turn to the reduction rules. First of all, we need to define W contexts: intuitively, contexts are proof terms with a hole, where the hole is denoted by , and E t means replacing the unique hole in the context E with the term t. Definition 2.1 (Weak head IPC contexts). W contexts are defined by the following grammar:
Reduction rules for IPC The reduction rules for the proof terms are given in Figure 2 : the first block defines → IPC by means of the usual rules for IPC, and the second block defines → V as → IPC plus additional reduction rules for the new construct V n [ x.t | | y.s 1 | y.s 2 | | z. u], depending on different shapes that t might have. Let us explain the intuition. In the first case (Visser-inj) , the term is the injection inj i t with possibly free variables x i of type B i → C i for i = 1 . . . n; in that branch one has chosen to prove one of the two disjuncts A 1 or A 2 , and we may just reduce to the corresponding proof s i , in which we plug the proof t but after binding the free variables x. In the second case (Visser-efq) , the disjunction is proved by means of a contradiction, and that contradiction may be used to prove any of the cases s 1 , s 2 , u. In the third case (Visser-app) , the term contains an application with one of the variables bound by the Visser rule on the left hand side, i.e. the proof uses one of the Visser assumptions to prove the disjunction. We reduce to the corresponding case u j , where λ x.t is substituted for the assumption of type (B i → C i ) i=1...n → B j . The reduction relation → V is obtained as usual as the structural closure of the reduction → V (and similarly for → IPC ).
As expected, V-terms normalize: we prove normalization by providing an evaluation function that reduces V-terms to intuitionistic terms. The idea is to define the evaluator by structural recursion on typed terms, and using normalization for IPC after each recursive call. Theorem A.1 (Normalization for V). V enjoys the normalization property.
The following is a consequence of Lemma A.2: Theorem 2.1. V-terms normalize to IPC-terms.
Beyond IPC: Harrop's Rule and KP
In the previous section we have been expecially careful in imposing the restriction on the open assumptions for the application of our new rules, in order to keep our calculus inside the intuitionistic world and to obtain precisely a characterization of admissibility. At this point, however, one can legitimately ask: what happens if we lift such restriction, and allow one or more admissible principles inside an extended logic? The system of rules we introduced assumes then a different role, that is the role of providing a simple and modular way to obtain Curry-Howard systems for semi-classical logics arising from the addition to IPC of axioms corresponding to admissible principles.
The simplest and oldest studied admissible rule of IPC is the rule of independence of premise, also known as Harrop's rule in its propositional variant [4] :
The logic that arises by adding it to IPC has also been studied, and is known as Kreisel-Putnam logic (KP). It was introduced by G. Kreisel and H. Putnam [8] to show a logic stronger than IPC that still could satisfy the disjunction property, thus providing a counterexample to the conjecture of Łukasiewicz that IPC was the only such logic.
We now proceed to define a Curry-Howard calculus for KP as an instance of the system we presented in the previous section. It suffices to realize that Harrop's rule is a particular case of Visser 1 where the formula C is taken to be ⊥ (note that the third disjunct in this instance of Visser 1 becomes ¬B → B, that implies both the other hypotheses ¬B → A 1 and ¬B → A 2 ; for this reason we can ignore it). Then we get the following simplified rule in natural deduction:
. . .
The restriction on the assumptions of the main premise is now gone, and open proofs are allowed. In fact Harrop's principle is provable in our system:
The proof term is a simplified version of the proof term for V 1 , where we remove the term corresponding to the trivialized third disjunct:
By inspecting the reduction rules for V, we realize that the rule Visser-app has no counterpart in KP: since the Harrop assumptions have negated type, their use in proof terms is completely encapsulated in exfalso terms (see Classification, Lemma B.1 below). Therefore the reduction rules for KP are the ones for IPC (Figure 2 ) plus the additional rules Harrop-inj and Harrop-efq in Figure 3 . We denote with → KP the toplevel reduction for KP, and with → KP its structural closure. We prove for KP the usual properties of subject reduction, classification, and strong normalization. As expected we denote with KP the provability in KP, but we use simply when not ambiguous.
Theorem B.1 (Subject reduction for KP). If Γ KP t : A and t → KP s, then Γ KP s : A.
In order to classify normal forms of KP, we need to consider proof terms with possibly open Harrop assumptions: we denote with Γ ¬ a negated typing context, i.e. of the form Γ ¬ = {x 1 : ¬A 1 , . . . , x n : ¬A n }. We obtain the following classification of normal forms:
Lemma B.1 (Classification for KP). Let Γ ¬ KP t : A for t in (weak head) normal form and t not ¬neutral:
• Implication: if A = B → C, then t is an abstraction or a variable in Γ ¬ ;
• Disjunction: if A = B ∨C, then t is an injection;
• Conjunction: if A = B ∧C, then t is a pair;
• Falsity: if A = ⊥, then t = x s for some s and some x ∈ Γ ¬ .
We prove that KP enjoys the strong normalization property, i.e. all typable terms are strongly normalizing. We use a modified version of the method of reducibility candidates by Girard-Tait [2] . The differences with respect to the usual proof are that Harrop and exfalso terms are added to neutral terms, and that the reductions for hop (which involve terms under binders) require special treatment.
Theorem B.2 (Strong normalization of KP). If Γ KP t : A, then t is strongly normalizing.
The complete proof is on the appendix. We can now prove the disjunction property: Lemma 3.1 (Consistency). KP t : ⊥ for no t.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists t (which we assume in normal form by Theorem B.2) such that KP t : ⊥, and derive a contradiction. We proceed by induction on the size of t. The base case is impossible because by Lemma B.1 t cannot be a variable. As for the inductive case, by Lemma B.1, t is either an exfalso, or x u ∈ Γ ¬ for some x ∈ Γ ¬ . In the former case t = efq s for some s such that KP s : ⊥, and we use the i.h.; the latter case is not possible, since Γ ¬ = / 0. 
Conclusions and Future Work
Our system provides a meaningful explanation of the admissible rules in terms of normalization of natural deduction proofs. In addition, by simply lifting the condition of having closed proofs on the main premise, we can study intermediate logics characterized by the axioms corresponding to some admissible rules; the study of the Kreisel-Putnam logic exemplifies this approach.
We believe that our presentation is well-suited to continue the study of admissibility in intuitionistic systems, a subject that is currently mostly explored with semantic tools. We devised powerful proofs of normalization for our systems KP and V, and we will try to extend these results to other similarly obtained systems. We conclude with some remarks on future generalizations.
The Logic AD
Now that we have shown the potential of our system in analysing the extension of IPC with axioms corresponding to admissible rules, we might wonder what could happen when we try to add several of them. We can be even more ambitious: what if we want to add all the Visser rules to IPC? A theorem by Rozière greatly simplifies our task: Theorem 4.1 (Rozière [9] ). All Visser rules are derivable in the logic AD, obtained by adding the V 1 axiom schema to IPC.
Clearly, since the Visser rules are derivable in AD they are also admissible; as we know from Theorem 1.1 this means that they form a basis for all the admissible rules of AD, and since they are derivable we obtain: Corollary 4.1. The logic AD is structurally complete.
However, we also know from Iemhoff [5] that IPC is the only logic that has the Visser rules as admissible rules and satisfies the disjunction property. This means that AD cannot satisfy the disjunction property. This was also proved with different techniques by Rozière, who also showed that AD is still weaker than CPC. Given these properties, AD seems the best candidate to be studied with our technique.
Arithmetic
Since its inception with Harrop [4] , the motivation for studying admissible rules of IPC was to understand arithmetical systems. A famous theorem of de Jongh states that the propositional formulas whose arithmetical instances are provable in intuitionistic arithmetic (HA) are exactly the theorems of IPC, and many studies of the admissible rules of HA (like Visser [11] , Iemhoff and Artemov [1] ) originated from it. In particular Visser shows that the propositional admissible rules of HA coincide with those of IPC, and that Σ 0 1 rules are also related. Harrop's principle, that we have investigated in this paper, is also known as the propositional Independence of Premise principle. Its first order version:
corresponds to an admissible rule of HA that has an important status in the theory of arithmetic, and was given a constructive interpretation for example by Gödel [3] with his well known Dialectica interpretation. We can assign to IP a proof term and two reduction rules that act in the same way as the ones introduced for Harrop's rule: that is, we will distinguish the two cases where there is an explicit proof of the existential in the antecedent, and where an exfalso reasoning has been carried on. We believe that a more advanced study of other admissible rules of HA can be carried on similar grounds.
• (∨ I ) t is an injection, and we conclude.
• (∨ E ) and t = case[s | | − | −] with Γ → s : D ∨ D . Because t is in normal form, s cannot be an injection. By i.h. s is →neutral, and therefore t is →neutral.
• (∧ I ) t is a pair, and we conclude.
• (∧ E ) and t = proj i s with Γ → s : D ∧ D . Because t is in normal form, s cannot be a pair. By i.h. s is →neutral, and therefore t is →neutral.
• (Visser n ) not possible.
by inversion, and derive a contradiction. By i.h. s is →neutral or an injection, but both cases contradict the hypothesis that t is a normal form.
In order to prove normalization, we define an evaluation function eval(·), mapping each typable term in V to its normal form. We first assume a corresponding function for IPC: Definition A.1 (eval IPC (·)). We call eval IPC (·) the function mapping each term typable in IPC to its normal form. Definition A.2 (eval(·)). Let t a term typable in V. We define its evaluation eval(t) by structural induction:
Note: the three cases in the definition of eval(·) on Visser terms are exhaustive by inspection of the normal forms of type disjunction (Lemma A.1) since it holds by inversion that Γ → t :
Proof. The three points can be proved mutually, by induction on the type derivation Γ V t : A: 1. follows by i.h. and by subject reduction for IPC;
2. follows by i.h. and from the fact that the output of eval IPC (·) are only normal forms;
3. follows by i.h. and from the fact that IPC is a subcalculus of V.
It easily follows: Theorem A.1 (Normalization for V). V enjoys the normalization property. It is easy to see, by induction on the definition of weak head contexts and by inversion, that Γ, x : ¬B t : ⊥; by ⊥ E we obtain Γ, x : ¬B efq t : A 1 . By → I we obtain Γ λ x. efq t : ¬B → A 1 , and by substitutivity we get the desired result Γ s 1 {λ x. efq t/y} : D.
B Theorems on KP
We say that a term is ¬neutral if it has the form W efq t . Lemma B.1 (Classification for KP). Let Γ ¬ KP t : A for t in (weak head) normal form and t not ¬neutral:
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of t:
• (ax) and t is a variable in Γ ¬ : by definition of Γ ¬ , the type of t is an implication, and we conclude.
• (→ I ) and t is an abstraction: trivial.
• (→ E ) and t = s u with Γ ¬ s : B → A. Because t is in normal form, s cannot be an abstraction. By i.h., s is either a variable in Γ ¬ or a ¬neutral term. In the first case, note that we have that A = ⊥ and t = xs, and the thesis holds; in the second case, t is ¬neutral and the thesis holds.
• (∨ I ) and t is an injection: trivial.
• (∨ E ) and
By i.h. s is either an injection or ¬neutral. The first case is not possible because t is in normal form; in the second case, t is ¬neutral as required.
• (∧ I ) and t is a pair: trivial.
• (∧ E ) and t = proj i s with Γ ¬ s : D 1 ∧ D 2 . By i.h. s is either a pair or ¬neutral, but the first case contradicts the hypothesis that t is in normal form. Therefore s is ¬neutral, and also t is ¬neutral.
• (⊥ E ) then t is immediately ¬neutral.
and derive a contradiction. By i.h. s is an injection or a ¬neutral term, but both cases contradict the hypothesis that t is in normal form.
B.1 Strong Normalization
In this section, we prove the strong normalization property for KP by means of an adapted version of Girard's method of candidates [2] . Let SN be the set of strongly normalizing terms of KP. By abuse of notation, we say that a context -be it an IPC context W or a KP context K -is strongly normalizing if all its "internal" λ -terms are strongly normalizing. → SN , SN ) . We define → SN as the "strongly normalizing" closure of → KP (Figure 2) One of the main properties of reducibility candidates is that they are backward closed under reduction: Definition B.3 (Backward closure ← − · ). Let T be a set of → SN nfs. We define its closure under backward weak head reduction as the set ← − T := {s | s SN t ∈ T }. This term is strongly normalizing because it is a reduct of t, and by hypothesis t ∈ SN. Therefore the reduction sequence must terminate.
Definition B.2 (Weak head reduction
Another key notion are neutral terms, that are intuitively → SN nfs that do not begin with constructors:
